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Abstract
This paper investigates algorithmic computability of simple games
(voting games). It shows that (i) games with a ﬁnite carrier are com-
putable, (ii) computable games have both ﬁnite winning coalitions and
coﬁnite losing coalitions, and (iii) computable games violate any con-
ceivable notion of anonymity, including ﬁnite anonymity and measure-
based anonymity. The paper argues that computable games are ex-
cluded from the intuitive class of “nice” inﬁnite games, employing the
notion of “insensitivity”—-equal treatment of any two coalitions that
diﬀer only on a ﬁnite set.
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11 Introduction
A coalitional game is a function that assigns a worth (number) to each coali-
tion of players. If there are only ﬁnitely many players, computability of the
function is not a problem. In that case, there are only ﬁnitely many coali-
tions and one can just construct a ﬁnite table listing all coalitions and their
worths. If there are inﬁnitely many players, computability becomes a prob-
lem. First, there are uncountably many coalitions, but one can observe (or
describe in English) only countably many of them. We have to restrict ob-
servable coalitions in a natural way. Second, we must describe each coalition
in order for an algorithm to recognize it. Third, the process of computing
the worth of a coalition from a description of it, has to be algorithmic.
This paper investigates algorithmic computability (Turing computabil-
ity) of a particular class of coalitional games, called simple games (voting
games). Simple games assign either 0 or 1 to each coalition of players. In
the setting of players who face a choice problem from a set of two alter-
natives, a coalition intuitively describes those players that prefer a certain
alternative to the other. Simple games are characterized by its winning
coalitions—those whose worth is 1. Winning coalitions are understood to
be those coalitions whose preferences count. The class of simple games has
close connections with social choice theory. The paper by Banks, Duggan,
and Le Breton (2003) is a recent example of a successful application of inﬁ-
nite simple games to political theory.
In the setting of Arrow’s Theorem, Kirman and Sondermann (1972) and
Armstrong (1980, 1985) prove that underlying a social welfare function sat-
isfying certain properties (Unanimity and Independence) is an ultraﬁlter, a
special case of a simple game. But ultraﬁlters (viewed as a simple game)
have a particular form—either they have no ﬁnite winning coalitions or they
are dictatorial in the sense that only one player’s preferences matter. I show
(Mihara, 1997) that among those ultraﬁlter-based social welfare functions,
only dictatorial functions are computable. This implies that an ultraﬁlter,
viewed as a simple game, is computable only if it has ﬁnite winning coali-
tions.
But what happens to simple games other than ultraﬁlters? Some simple
games are not dictatorial but has a ﬁnite carrier—this means that the games
are in eﬀect ﬁnite, or almost all players’ preferences are ignored. Some simple
games are not dictatorial and do not have a ﬁnite carrier, but have ﬁnite
winning coalitions. The above result (Mihara, 1997) from computability
analysis of social choice leaves open the question about computability of
such simple games (that are not ultraﬁlters). One may get an impression
that “games that depend on inﬁnitely many players’ preferences” are not
computable. A result characterizing computable simple games is called for.
In this paper, I give a suﬃcient condition and necessary conditions for
computability of simple games. As criteria for such characterization, I pay
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ably deﬁne the notion of computability. I discard a notion (σ-computability)
that excludes even dictatorial games from the class of computable games.
I argue that the failure of σ-computability is due to the lack of descriptive
power of indices describing each coalition. Instead, I introduce the notion
of δ-computability, which uses suﬃciently descriptive indices.
With δ-computability, the results are as follows: (i) Proposition 4 shows
that games with a ﬁnite carrier are computable. In particular, dictatorial
games are. (ii) Corollary 9 shows that computable games have both ﬁnite
winning coalitions and coﬁnite losing coalitions. An implication of these
two results is Corollary 10 saying that a ﬁlter, viewed as a simple game,
is computable iﬀ it has a ﬁnite carrier. (iii) Section 3.3 (Corollary 11 in
particular) argues that computable games violate any conceivable notion of
anonymity, including ﬁnite anonymity and measure-based anonymity.
Result (i) is intuitive since games with a ﬁnite carrier are in eﬀect ﬁnite,
and our intuition tells ﬁnite games are computable. This is the class of
games that one would safely exclude from the intuitive class of “games that
depend on inﬁnitely many players’ preferences.”
On the other hand, those games with both ﬁnite winning coalitions and
coﬁnite losing coalitions may not necessarily be excluded from this intuitive
class. But one would expect that “nice” games “that depend on inﬁnitely
many players’ preferences,” are insensitive in the following sense: any two
coalitions that diﬀer only on a ﬁnite set have the same status as winning
or losing. Result (ii) implies computable games are not insensitive (Corol-
lary 12): they cannot ignore ﬁnitely many players. This result, combined
with Result (iii), has a strong implication that computable games are ex-
cluded from the intuitive class of “nice” inﬁnite games.
A complete characterization of computable simple games involves much
more intricate arguments of recursion theory than this paper. It will be
available in a collaborative work (Kumabe and Mihara (in preparation)).
In the collaborative work, the connection of computability and well-known
properties of simple games is also investigated. We will construct, for exam-
ple, a computable simple game that is monotonic, proper, strong, nonweak,
and has no ﬁnite carrier.
2 Framework
2.1 Simple games
Let N = N = {0,1,2,...} be a countable set of (the names of) players. Any
recursive (algorithmically decidable) subset of N is called a (recursive)
coalition.
Intuitively, a simple game describes in a crude manner the power distri-
bution among observable (describable) subsets of players. Since the cognitive
3ability of a human (or machine) is limited, it is not natural to assume that
all subsets of players are observable, when there are inﬁnitely many players.
I therefore assume that only recursive subsets are observable. This is a
natural assumption in the present context, where algorithmic properties of
simple games are investigated. According to Church’s Thesis, the recursive
coalitions are the sets of players for which there is an algorithm that can
decide for the name of each player whether she is in the set.1 Note that the
class REC of recursive coalitions forms a Boolean algebra; that is, it
includes N and is closed under union, intersection, and complementation.
Formally, a (simple) game is a collection ω ⊆ REC of (recursive) coali-
tions. I often require that N ∈ ω. The coalitions in ω are said to be
winning. A coalition is said to be losing if it is not winning. One can
regard a simple game as a function from REC to {0,1}, assigning the value
1 or 0 to each coalition depending on whether it is winning or losing.
Remark 1. I assume that observable subsets of players are recursive,
not just r.e. (recursively enumerable). I explain why. First, nonrecursive
r.e. sets are observable in a very limited sense. An r.e. set is a set whose
members can be enumerated by some algorithm. This does not mean in
general that there is a method to tell whether a given player belongs to it.
Second, the r.e. sets do not form a Boolean algebra, but certain properties of
simple games implicitly assume that the observable coalitions form a Boolean
algebra. For example, the property of strongness requires the complement
of any losing coalition to be winning. In the setting where the complement
of some losing coalition is not observable (indeed, the complement of an r.e.
set is not necessarily r.e.), the notion, or any modiﬁcation of it, is of limited
interest. I give a third reason in Remark 2. k
I introduce from the theory of cooperative games a few basic notions of
simple games (Peleg, 1984; Weber, 1994). A simple game ω is said to be
proper if for all coalitions S, S ∈ ω implies N \ S / ∈ ω. ω is monotonic
if for all coalitions S and T, the conditions S ∈ ω and T ⊇ S imply T ∈ ω.
ω is strong if for all coalitions S, S / ∈ ω implies N \ S ∈ ω. ω is weak if
the intersection
T
ω of the winning coalitions is nonempty. The members of T
ω are called veto players; they are the players that belong to all winning
coalitions. (The set
T
ω of veto players may or may not be observable.) ω
is dictatorial if there exists some i0 (called a dictator) in N such that
ω = {S ∈ REC : i0 ∈ S }. Note that a dictator is a veto player, but a veto
player is not necessarily a dictator.
A carrier of a simple game ω is a coalition S ⊆ N such that
T ∈ ω ⇐⇒ S ∩ T ∈ ω
1Soare (1987) gives a more precise deﬁnition of recursive sets as well as detailed dis-
cussion of recursion theory. My earlier papers (Mihara, 1997; Mihara, 1999) contain short
reviews of recursion theory.
4for all coalitions T.
Finally, I introduce a few notions from the theory of Boolean alge-
bras (Koppelberg, 1989); they can be regarded as properties of simple games.
A monotonic simple game ω is called a ﬁlter if it is closed with respect to
ﬁnite intersection: if S, S0 ∈ ω, then S ∩S0 ∈ ω. We may think of a ﬁlter as
a family of “large” sets. Note that a ﬁlter has the ﬁnite intersection prop-
erty (the intersection of ﬁnitely many winning coalitions is nonempty), but
it may or may not have a veto player. A ﬁlter ω is called an ultraﬁlter if it
is a strong simple game. If ω is an ultraﬁlter, then S ∪ S0 ∈ ω implies that
S ∈ ω or S0 ∈ ω. A free ultraﬁlter is an ultraﬁlter that is not dictatorial; a
free ultraﬁlter does not contain any ﬁnite coalitions.
2.2 Indicators for simple games
To deﬁne the notions of computability for simple games, I introduce below
two indicators for them. In order to do that, I ﬁrst represent each recur-
sive coalition by a natural number: either by an r.e. index (Σ1-index) or
by a characteristic index (∆0-index). A characteristic index gives more in-
formation about the coalition that it represents than an r.e. index does.
The indicators then assign the value 0 or 1 to each number representing a
recursive coalition, depending on whether the coalition is winning or los-
ing. When a number does not represent a recursive coalition, the value is
undeﬁned.






1 if We is recursive and We ∈ ω,
0 if We is recursive and We / ∈ ω,
↑ if We is nonrecursive,
(1)
where We = {x : ϕe(x) ↓} is the domain of the eth partial recursive function.
Note that σω(e) = σω(e0) if We = We0. Using r.e. indices (Σ1-indices) for





1 if e is an r.e. index for a recursive set in ω,
0 if e is an r.e. index for a recursive set not in ω,
↑ if e is not an r.e. index for any recursive set.
(2)






1 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set in ω,
0 if e is a characteristic index for a recursive set not in ω,
↑ if e is not a characteristic index for any recursive set.
(3)
Note that δω is well-deﬁned since each e ∈ N can be a characteristic index
(∆0-index) for at most one set.
52.3 Computability notions
I now introduce notions of σ-computable simple games and δ-computable
simple games. These notions of computability are weaker than Exact Com-
putability and Strong Computability in Appendix A. The latter notions and
their variants are too strong, easily leading to impossibility results.
σ-Computability σω has an extension to a partial recursive function.
δ-Computability δω has an extension to a partial recursive function.
The following lemma states that σ-Computability implies δ-Computability.
Lemma 1 If a simple game ω is σ-computable, then it is δ-computable.
Proof. Suppose that ω is σ-computable. Then σω has an extension σ0 to
a partial recursive function.
Let ϕe be the eth partial recursive function. Using the Parameter Theo-




1 if ϕe(u) = 1,
↑ otherwise.
We claim that σ0 ◦ f is an extension of δω. To show this, suppose that
e is a characteristic index for a recursive B. Then f(e) is an r.e. index for B.
Now, if B is in ω, then by (2), σ0(f(e)) = σω(f(e)) = 1. Similarly, if B is
not in ω, then σ0(f(e)) = σω(f(e)) = 0.
3 The Main Results
3.1 σ-Computability
The following results suggest that σ-Computability is not a good notion of
computability. I will come back to this point in Section 3.2.
Proposition 2 Suppose that N ∈ ω and ∅ / ∈ ω. Then the simple game ω is
not σ-computable. In particular, proper simple games violate the condition.
Proof. Suppose that σ-Computability is satisﬁed with an extension σ0 of
σ = σω. As shown below, we can deﬁne a recursive function f such that
Wf(e) =
(
N if e ∈ K,
∅ otherwise.
(4)
where K = {e : e ∈ We }. K is known (Soare, 1987, I.4.3 and I.4.4, pp. 18–9)
to be a nonrecursive r.e. set.
6Details. Deﬁne a partial function θ by
θ(e,u) =
½
0 if e ∈ K,
↑ otherwise.
Then θ is partial recursive since its graph g is r.e. ((e,u,y) ∈ g iﬀ y =
0 & e ∈ K.) Hence, for some z, θ = ϕ
(2)
z . By the Parameter Theorem
(s-m-n Theorem), there is a recursive function s = s1
1 such that
ϕs(z,e)(u) = ϕ(2)
z (e,u) = θ(e,u).
Let f(e) = s(z,e). Then f is recursive and
ϕf(e)(u) ↓ ⇐⇒ θ(e,u) ↓ ⇐⇒ e ∈ K.
Hence (4) follows. ♦
Since N ∈ ω and ∅ / ∈ ω, and these sets are recursive, we have, by (4)
and (1),
e ∈ K =⇒ Wf(e) = N =⇒ σ0(f(e)) = σ(f(e)) = 1,
and
e / ∈ K =⇒ Wf(e) = ∅ =⇒ σ0(f(e)) = σ(f(e)) = 0.
This gives an algorithm to decide whether e ∈ K, contradicting the fact that
K is nonrecursive.
Corollary 3 If a simple game ω is σ-computable, then it is not proper.
Furthermore, if it is monotonic, then ω = REC; that is, all coalitions are
winning.
3.2 δ-Computability
The following proposition asserts that games that are in eﬀect ﬁnite are
δ-computable, as expected.
Proposition 4 Suppose that a simple game ω has a ﬁnite carrier. Then ω
is δ-computable.
Proof. Suppose that ω has a ﬁnite carrier S = {s0,...,sm}, where s0 <
··· < sm. Let ωS = {S∩T : T ∈ ω } be the collection of all the intersections
of a winning coalition with S. (ωS is the collection of all winning coalitions
in S.) Then ωS is ﬁnite and the collection of all subsets of S is also ﬁnite.
Assign to each subcoalition T ⊆ S the number
hT(s0),...,T(sm)i,
where T is identiﬁed with its characteristic function (so that T(x) = 1 iﬀ
x ∈ T, and T(x) = 0 iﬀ x / ∈ T) and hx0,x1,...,xmi denotes the image
7of (x0,x1,...,xm) under a certain one-to-one recursive function from Nm+1
onto N. The function can be constructed from the standard pairing function
as in Soare (1987, I.3.6, p. 16). For example, if T = {s0,s1,s3} and m = 4,
then
hT(s0),...,T(sm)i = h1,1,0,1,0i.
Note that each subcoalition of S is identiﬁed with a unique number. Let
WIN = {hT(s0),...,T(sm)i : T ∈ ωS }
be the set of numbers assigned to winning coalitions in S and let LOSE be
the set of numbers assigned to losing coalitions in S. The sets WIN and
LOSE are recursive since they are ﬁnite.
Let
α(e) = hϕe(s0),...,ϕe(sm)i
if all of ϕe(s0), ..., ϕe(sm) are either 0 or 1; otherwise, let α(e) ↑. If e is
a characteristic index for a recursive coalition T (which is not necessarily a






1 if α(e) ∈ WIN,
0 if α(e) ∈ LOSE,
↑ otherwise.
Then, clearly, δ0 is partial recursive and an extension of δω.
In particular, if a simple game ω is dictatorial, then ω is δ-computable.
Indeed, the coalition consisting of the dictator is a ﬁnite carrier for the
dictatorial game ω. In contrast, Proposition 2 implies that a dictatorial
game cannot be σ-computable.
The reason for the diﬀerence lies in the ways each coalition is described.
To decide whether a particular coalition is winning or not in a dictatorial
game, one has only to check whether the dictator is in the coalition. In
the case of δ-Computability, each coalition is described by a characteristic
index, which gives a computable characteristic function of the coalition. So,
one can tell whether the dictator is in the coalition simply by putting his
name into the algorithm. In the case of σ-Computability, each coalition is
described by an r.e. index. But an r.e. index only gives an algorithm for a
partial computable function whose domain is the coalition. If the dictator
is in the coalition, the algorithm will eventually halt; but if not, then it will
never halt. So, if the dictator is not in the coalition, one cannot generally
be assured that the dictator is not.
Note that if a game has a ﬁnite carrier S and N is winning, then there
exits a ﬁnite winning coalition, namely S = N ∩ S. When there does not
exist a ﬁnite winning coalition, it is a corollary (Corollary 6) of the following
negative result that the computability condition is violated. (The number
8k is identiﬁed with the set {0,1,...,k − 1}, following the set-theoretic no-
tation.)
Proposition 5 Suppose that a simple game ω has an inﬁnite winning coali-
tion S ∈ ω such that for each k ∈ N, its k-initial segment S ∩ k is losing.
Then ω is not δ-computable.
Proof. Let ω be a simple game satisfying the assumption. Suppose that
ω is δ-computable. Then there exists a partial recursive function δ0 which
extends δω.
Let K = {e : e ∈ We }. K is a nonrecursive r.e. set. Since K is r.e.,
there is (Soare, 1987, II.1.2, p. 28) a recursive set R ⊆ N × N such that
e ∈ K ⇐⇒ ∃zR(e,z).
Using the Parameter Theorem, deﬁne a recursive function f by
ϕf(e)(u) =
(
1 if ¬∃z ≤ u R(e,z) and u ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Details. The function h deﬁned by
h(e,u) =
(
1 if ¬∃z ≤ u R(e,z) and u ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
is recursive (since R and S are recursive). Hence, for some y, h = ϕ
(2)
y . By
the Parameter Theorem, there is a recursive function s such that
ϕs(y,e)(u) = ϕ(2)
y (e,u) = h(e,u).
Let f(e) = s(y,e). Then f is recursive. ♦
Now,
e ∈ K =⇒ ϕf(e)(u) = 1 iﬀ u is small and u ∈ S
=⇒ f(e) is a characteristic index for an initial segment of S
=⇒ δ0(f(e)) = δω(f(e)) = 0,
but
e / ∈ K =⇒ ϕf(e)(u) = 1 iﬀ u ∈ S
=⇒ f(e) is a characteristic index for S
=⇒ δ0(f(e)) = δω(f(e)) = 1.
This implies that K is recursive, contradicting the fact that it is not.
The following Corollary states that any δ-computable simple game (such
that N is winning) has a ﬁnite winning coalition.
9Corollary 6 Suppose that N ∈ ω. If all ﬁnite coalitions are losing (that
is, if there is no ﬁnite winning coalition), then the simple game ω is not
δ-computable.
I also state results that are close to the preceding proposition and corol-
lary.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ∅ / ∈ ω. Suppose that the simple game ω has an
inﬁnite coalition S ∈ ω such that for each k ∈ N, its diﬀerence S \k = {s ∈
S : s ≥ k} from the initial segment is winning. Then ω is not δ-computable.
Proof. Let ω be a simple game satisfying the assumption. Suppose that
ω is δ-computable. Then there exists a partial recursive function δ0 which
extends δω.
Let K = {e : e ∈ We }. K is a nonrecursive r.e. set. Since K is r.e.,
there is (Soare, 1987, II.1.2, p. 28) a recursive set R ⊆ N × N such that




1 if ∃z ≤ u R(e,z) and u ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Now,
e ∈ K =⇒ ϕf(e)(u) = 1 iﬀ u is large and u ∈ S
=⇒ f(e) is a characteristic index for the diﬀerence
of S from an initial segment
=⇒ δ0(f(e)) = δω(f(e)) = 1,
but
e / ∈ K =⇒ ϕf(e)(u) = 0 for all u
=⇒ f(e) is a characteristic index for ∅
=⇒ δ0(f(e)) = δω(f(e)) = 0.
This implies that K is recursive, contradicting the fact that it is not.
A coﬁnite set is the complement of a ﬁnite set. The following corollary
is the dual of Corollary 6.
Corollary 8 Suppose that ∅ / ∈ ω. If all coﬁnite coalitions are winning, then
the simple game ω is not δ-computable.
Combining Corollary 6 and Corollary 8, I get the following powerful
criterion for checking computability of simple games.
10Corollary 9 Suppose that N ∈ ω and ∅ / ∈ ω. If the simple game ω is δ-
computable, then some ﬁnite coalition is winning and some coﬁnite coalition
is losing.
Finally, the following result generalizes the earlier result (Mihara, 1997)
that an ultraﬁlter, viewed as a simple game, is computable iﬀ it is dictatorial.
Corollary 10 A ﬁlter, viewed as a simple game, is δ-computable iﬀ it has
a ﬁnite carrier.
Proof. (⇐=). Immediate from Proposition 4.
(=⇒). Suppose a ﬁlter is computable. Then, by Corollary 6, it has a
ﬁnite winning coalition S. It is easy to show that S is in fact a carrier.
3.3 Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable games
As an application of the results in Section 3.2, I show that (under some
weak conditions) δ-computable simple games violate any conceivable notion
of anonymity as well as a related notion of insensitivity. The emphasis here
is not on generality of assertions, but on illustrating the usefulness of the
above results for obtaining nontrivial results about computable games.
Anonymity is usually deﬁned by way of a permutation on the set of
players. We say that a simple game ω is anonymous if for any permutation
π : N → N and for any coalition S, if π(S) = {π(i) : i ∈ S} is recursive,
we have S ∈ ω iﬀ π(S) ∈ ω. (We may instead restrict π to those such
that π(S) is recursive for any recursive S.) This deﬁnition requires that
any two coalitions of the same cardinality be treated equally. It is a rather
strong requirement, violated by any simple game that has an inﬁnite winning
coalition with an inﬁnite, losing complement. (Mihara (1997b) discusses a
closely related problem in a diﬀerent setting.)
If in the above deﬁnition we restrict permutations to those that permute
only ﬁnitely many players, we say the game is ﬁnitely anonymous. In
particular, ﬁnitely anonymous games treat any two coalitions with the same
ﬁnite number of players equally. Finite anonymity is a notion much weaker
than anonymity. For example, free (nondictatorial) ultraﬁlters are ﬁnitely
anonymous.
The following corollary is a strong one, which shows that even ﬁnite
anonymity is easily violated by computable simple games (we can actu-
ally drop the properness and monotonicity conditions—assuming ∅ / ∈ ω
instead—in the following corollary (Kumabe and Mihara (in preparation))):
Corollary 11 Suppose that N ∈ ω. Suppose that the simple game ω is
proper, monotonic, and δ-computable. Then it is not ﬁnitely anonymous.
11Proof. Let ω be a simple game satisfying the conditions. Suppose ω is
ﬁnitely anonymous. From Proposition 5, ω has a ﬁnite winning coalition
S = {0,1,...,k − 1}. By properness, N \ S = {k,k + 1,...} is losing. By
monotonicity, S0 = {k,k + 1,...,2k − 1} ⊂ N \ S is losing. Since S and
S0 are ﬁnite and have the same number of elements, they should be treated
equally by the ﬁnitely anonymous ω. But S is winning and S0 is not.
Another way of deﬁning anonymity is by way of a measure on the set
of players. (Gomberg, Martinelli, and Torres (2002) study measure-based
anonymity in the setting of preference aggregation rules.) A coalition mea-
sure space (N,REC,µ) is a list of the set N of players, the set REC of coali-
tions, and a ﬁnitely additive probability measure µ on REC. We say that a
simple game ω is µ-anonymous if for any coalition S and S0, µ(S) = µ(S0)
implies S ∈ ω ⇐⇒ S0 ∈ ω.
If each one-player coalition {i} is of measure zero (i.e., µ({i}) = 0), then
any ﬁnite coalition is of measure zero. So, µ-anonymous games must treat
any two ﬁnite coalitions equally. This implies that ﬁnite winning coalition
S (Corollary 9) and S0 = ∅ must be treated equally by a computable game,
if it is µ-anonymous. But S0 = ∅ is not winning under the assumption of
Corollary 9, while S is. Therefore, the game is not µ-anonymous.
Since there is no permutation that maps ∅ to S, this argument is not the
same as the one against permutation-based anonymity. Rather, it is based
on a particular property of a µ-anonymous game: it is insensitive in the
sense that it ignores ﬁnitely many players.
When there are inﬁnitely many players, a natural requirement for a
simple game is that ﬁnitely many players do not count. (Banks, Duggan,
and Le Breton (2003) require that measure zero of players do not count.)
The following insensitivity criterion for simple games formalizes this idea.
Here, the symmetric diﬀerence S4S0 of sets S and S0 is deﬁned by S4S0 =
(S \ S0) ∪ (S0 \ S). A simple game ω is insensitive if for any coalitions S
and S0, whenever they have a ﬁnite symmetric diﬀerence, we have S ∈ ω iﬀ
S0 ∈ ω. For example, free ultraﬁlters are insensitive. One can easily check
that a µ-anonymous game is insensitive. Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton
(2003) deﬁne “simple games” so that they are monotonic and insensitive
(assuming that each player is of measure zero).
I conclude with a negative result, which implies that the δ-computable
simple games are excluded from the intuitive class of “nice” inﬁnite games.
Corollary 12 Suppose that N ∈ ω and ∅ / ∈ ω. If the simple game ω is
δ-computable, then it is not insensitive.
Proof. From Corollary 9, we have a ﬁnite winning coalition S. But S
and S0 = ∅ have a ﬁnite symmetric diﬀerence, while S0 is losing.
12Appendix A: Stronger Notions of Computability
There are several alternative conditions of computability that look more
appealing on intuitive grounds than σ-Computability and δ-Computability
introduced in Section 2.3. I show that such conditions are too strong to be
satisﬁed.
Let σω be the σ-indicator (1) of a simple game ω. Exact Computability
below requires that there exist an algorithm that, given an r.e. index for
a recursive coalition, tells whether the coalition is winning or not. When
a number is given that is not an r.e. index for any recursive coalition, the
algorithm must not give an output.
Exact Computability σω is partial recursive.
Exact Computability is too stringent since it requires a certain partial
function to be computable on a domain on which there is no computable
partial function.
Proposition 13 No simple game satisﬁes Exact Computability.
Proof. Suppose the indicator σω is partial recursive. Then its domain
must be r.e. But the domain {e : We is recursive} is known (Soare, 1987,
p. 21) not to be r.e.
Exact Computability requires an algorithm that does not give an output
in the case that the input is not an r.e. index for any recursive coalition.
It would be nice if such such an algorithm could instead give an output in
this case too, indicating that the input is not legitimate. This leads to the
following condition:
Strong Computability The extension σ0 of σω deﬁned as follows is recur-
sive: σ0(e) = 2 if e is not an r.e. index for any recursive set.
Unfortunately, this condition cannot be met by any simple game.
Proposition 14 No simple game satisﬁes Strong Computability.
Proof. Suppose that σ0 is recursive. Then σω is partial recursive. This
means that Exact Computability is satisﬁed, contradicting Proposition 13.
In the above deﬁnitions of computability, I used the indicator σω, where
legitimate inputs are the r.e. indices (Σ1-indices) for recursive coalitions.
Using the indicator δω, where legitimate inputs are the characteristic indices
(∆0-indices) for recursive coalitions, I can deﬁne conditions similar to Exact
Computability and to Strong Computability for simple games. It turns out
that no simple games satisfy these conditions. This can be proved similarly
13from the result (Mihara, 1997, Lemma 2) that the set of characteristic indices
for a recursive set is not r.e.
Remark 2. Remark 1 gave two reasons why I do not assume that the
observable subsets of players are the r.e. sets. The third reason is that no
satisfactory notion of computability (which does not resort to nonrecursive
oracles) can be deﬁned if a simple game ω is deﬁned on the domain of all




1 if We ∈ ω,
0 if We / ∈ ω.
And the only sensible computability condition would be to require σ1
ω to
be recursive. It then follows that the index set {e : We ∈ ω } is recursive.
But Rice’s Theorem in turn implies that ω consists of all r.e. sets (if ω 6= ∅,
as I assume). In other words, the only game satisfying the computability
requirement is the one in which every subset of players is winning. k
References
Armstrong, T. E. (1980). Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition alge-
bras. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 7:55–75.
Armstrong, T. E. (1985). Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions: Er-
ratum and addendum to ‘Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition
algebras’. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 14:57–59.
Banks, J. S., J. Duggan, and M. Le Breton (2003). Social choice and electoral
competition in the general spatial model. Mimeo.
Gomberg, A., C. Martinelli, and R. Torres (2002). Anonymity in large soci-
eties. Instituto Tecnol´ ogico Aut´ onomo de M´ exico. Forthcoming in Social
Choice and Welfare.
Kirman, A. P. and D. Sondermann (1972). Arrow’s Theorem, many agents,
and invisible dictators. Journal of Economic Theory, 5:267–277.
Koppelberg, S. (1989). Handbook of Boolean Algebras, volume 1. North-
Holland, Amsterdam. Edited by J. D. Monk, with the cooperation of
R. Bonnet.
Kumabe, M. and H. R. Mihara (in preparation). Computability of simple
games.
Mihara, H. R. (1997). Arrow’s Theorem and Turing computability. Eco-
nomic Theory, 10: 257–76.
14Mihara, H. R. (1997b). Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrow’s Theorem with
Restricted Coalition Algebras. Social Choice and Welfare, 14: 503–12.
Mihara, H. R. (1999). Arrow’s theorem, countably many agents, and more
visible invisible dictators. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 32:267–
287.
Peleg, B. (1984). Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Soare, R. I. (1987). Recursively Enumerable Sets and Degrees: A Study
of Computable Functions and Computably Generated Sets. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin.
Weber, R. J. (1994). Games in coalitional form. In Aumann, R. J. and
Hart, S., editors, Handbook of Game Theory, volume 2, chapter 36,
pages 1285–1303. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
15